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F key not available
Posted: 13 Jan 2026, 08:52
by Dlew
One of the process safety event occured due to a valve could not be operated well in time just because F key was not available.
To address such an issue, what should be the consideration?
Re: F key not available
Posted: 18 Jan 2026, 06:52
by jeem
Actually, this should not be taken just as-is.
In my opinion, such critical valves which play role in controlling the escalation so that a major accident hazard could be prevented should be falling under a critical barrier to maintain. The valve does not seem to be any other valve, and that is the very reason that it caused a process safety event.
Recommendations should be stronger, and before that, it is required to be ensured that observations are correctly made.
Re: F key not available
Posted: 21 Jan 2026, 08:00
by ivani1
This is actually to understand the criticality.
For any valve that must be operated within X minutes to prevent escalation, is the operating key/tool guaranteed available at point of use, at all times?
What I see here is to create a short list of valves that are:
Required for emergency isolation / depressurization / diversion
Referenced in operating procedures, ESD cause & effect, alarm response, emergency response
Used for loss of containment control (API 754 Tier 1–3 learning)
Now what I think is required to be done to avoid any such instance in future is to consider the following:
Replace with handwheel / lever where feasible
Use quarter-turn with lever + locking method
Convert to powered actuator (pneumatic/electric/hydraulic) with:
Local pushbutton + remote operation (DCS/ESD)
Fail-safe position defined (fail-close/fail-open)
Use ESD valve where this valve is genuinely critical
If the valve is genuinely needed for safety mitigation, the best fix is: don’t make safety depend on a missing tool.
At least that is what I would do myself with my team on immediate basis before another such scenario happens.
Re: F key not available
Posted: 24 Jan 2026, 20:21
by jeem
This is what exactly is important to consider.
Dlew, I hope you have a multidisciplinary team with you doing all the thorough work on this.
I would go for an elimination of the risk like suggested by ivani1.
"Not a single valve highlighted as a mitigation to avoid any escalation in HAZID /HAZOP requiring an F-key to operate."
Inviting all too many variables, may suitable for other cases but in these, preventing a major accident hazard.
ivani1 wrote: 21 Jan 2026, 08:00
This is actually to understand the criticality.
For any valve that must be operated within X minutes to prevent escalation, is the operating key/tool guaranteed available at point of use, at all times?
What I see here is to create a short list of valves that are:
Required for emergency isolation / depressurization / diversion
Referenced in operating procedures, ESD cause & effect, alarm response, emergency response
Used for loss of containment control (API 754 Tier 1–3 learning)
Now what I think is required to be done to avoid any such instance in future is to consider the following:
Replace with handwheel / lever where feasible
Use quarter-turn with lever + locking method
Convert to powered actuator (pneumatic/electric/hydraulic) with:
Local pushbutton + remote operation (DCS/ESD)
Fail-safe position defined (fail-close/fail-open)
Use ESD valve where this valve is genuinely critical
If the valve is genuinely needed for safety mitigation, the best fix is: don’t make safety depend on a missing tool.
At least that is what I would do myself with my team on immediate basis before another such scenario happens.