PetroStreet

What kind of maintenance strategy should be implemented to control frequent cases of PSVs upstream isolation valve passing?
PM gets overdue or even a case of problematic PSV gets dragged just because the upstream isolation valve is passing, and handover is not possible.

Here are there but at many different forums here on PS, a lot is being talked, and shared on PSV.
I am expecting PS to become a source of a lot many discussions on PSV.
What exactly can Operations, and maintenance do in this case. Operations, for sure can't issue you an energy isolation permit , and now it is on maintenance to think further. What kind of upstream isolation valve we are talking about? Has it remained problematic in the past as well? Did we do something about that during that time? And if this the first time then let's see what are the alternatives we have. PSV discharge is closed system? Open system? Assess that. Perform some sort of a risk assessment. Open system, hazardous discharge would require an immediate attention. Do whatever is necessary to address that. Even if it has to be a plant shutdown call.
Closed system but having impact on downstream or eventually affecting emissions, move again if that is affecting environmental KPIs to go for unit shutdown.
Has to be a case-to-case analysis of the situation and act on that.

Actually, I was asking in a way that how that situation now be addressed.
Have got this happened and would look separately to any preventive solution.
Yes, Operations would not be issuing any permit but what solution maintenance could still apply to avoid a shutdown.
Discussion purposes for any best practices adapted at other sites.

I am not sure that how your sites are gonna see this but here now at our place, every such case of PSV which cannot be handed over for testing (due to any issue including this very common, upstream valve passing) is a Process Safety issue. They now declare that Safety Instrumented Function availability problem.
PSV is in a non-maintainable state = unavailable when needed
Now the isolation part itself is considered as SIS.
We have cases where problematic critical loop PSVs isolation has already been changed to DBB.
And irish, yes with such situation, you can only consider a live isolation (if possible) with 3-way PSV diverter.

I would agree with arcpro here that the issue itself tends to be a process safety related.
The practices are required to be challenged here. Such valves should be identified on priority, and these should then be connected with existing HAZOP reports, and if nothing is found there, then go ahead in sharing these instances with the team which plans to perform revalidation of existing HAZOP for the facility.
The best practices in such cases are:
Have leak-rate limits for PSV block valves
Periodically pressure test the DBB cavity
Replace valves at first passing
Treat PSV isolation as part of the SIS / IPL